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A new form of ‘interdisciplinarity’ may be emerging but has so far failed to devote equal demands on the
natural sciences, as well as on the social sciences. Will Davies responds to the calls for a social
science shake-up by questioning the status of the social sciences in 2014 as something other than
mere understudies to the natural sciences. The shared terrain of the two, he argues, seems to rest
on various acts of forgetting on the part of the social sciences, but no acts of learning on the part of
the natural sciences.
This is part of a series of posts ahead of the event on Tuesday 21st October, Do We Need to Shake
Up the Social Sciences #LSESocialSciences. You can find our interview with Nicholas Christakis
which kicked off the debate here.
Imagine someone establishes a new think tank within the UK government, perhaps like the Strategy Unit which
existed in the Cabinet Office for a few years. It finds its feet, develops a reputation, struggles for funding
occasionally, but gradually develops a sense of identity and purpose. Part of this is to reflect on the nature of policy,
to provide a space in which the instruments of the state can be questioned. After a few years, the Ministry of Defense
comes knocking on its door, accusing it of being too conservative and not sufficiently ‘inter-departmental’. “So what
should we be doing instead?”, the small think tank pleads. “Well you could help us with these nuclear submarines for
starters,” comes the reply.
The charge that the social sciences have become too ‘conservative’ and insufficiently ‘interdisciplinary’ is a
persuasive one. But one has to pay careful attention to what is being proposed as a solution. For Amanda Goodall
and Andrew Oswald, applauding a recent polemic by Nicholas Christakis (interview here), it appears to mean one
thing only: the social sciences must become not only cognizant of the natural sciences, but actively supportive of
their research agendas. Only this way can the social sciences connect with major policy problems such as climate
change, and overcome their stultifying resistance to change.
According to Goodall and Oswald, the subject matters which should be imported into the curricula of the social
sciences include:
modern brain science, the geophysics of climate change, the hormone cortisol, the biology of skin
resistance, the genetic polymorphism 5-HTTLPR, the life-cycle happiness of great apes, the
physiological effects of oxytocin or the nature of herd behaviour in zebrafish.
Meanwhile, Christakis seems to have grown bored of the traditional subject matter of social science:
I’m not suggesting that social scientists stop teaching and investigating classic topics like monopoly
power, racial profiling and health inequality. But everyone knows that monopoly power is bad for
markets, that people are racially biased and that illness is unequally distributed by social class.
Progress, apparently, would lie in looking to new forms of ‘interdisciplinarity’ with the natural sciences.
Most social scientists probably share some of the anxieties expressed in these articles. The sense that the journal
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system has become a self-perpetuating oligarchy; the sense that career incentives mitigate against transgression of
boundaries (though these include managerial and political boundaries as much as ‘disciplinary’ ones); the sense that
too few social scientists are driven by the most urgent needs of the present.
Yet social scientists are already developing ‘digital methods’ and trying to engage with ‘big data’, albeit with a
sometimes skeptical eye. Many of them lack the job security, confidence or the freedom to disappear into their
pejorative ‘ivory towers’ any longer.  And the case against knee-jerk hostility towards the life sciences has been
articulated compellingly by the British sociologist, Nikolas Rose (interview here).
WEIZAC, the first modern computer in the Middle East – Image credit: Wikimedia, Public
Domain
However, there are a number of grave problems with Goodall and Oswald’s call to arms. Firstly, it is entirely
ahistorical. Being ahistorical may not matter if you are a dealing with the ‘life-cycle happiness of great apes’, but it
does matter if you’re dealing with ‘racial profiling’. There is a simple reason for this: if great apes do history
themselves, then we are not able to understand it, whereas races and racial profilers have histories, which they can
articulate and which influence how they act. To overlook this is to deny oneself the possibility of simple interpretation
of other people’s lives.
Goodall, Oswald and Christakis demonstrate scant curiosity about what the social sciences are, or where they came
from. The unspoken implication is that they are simply a junior off-shoot of a naturalist project which began around
the time of Francis Bacon. Is it not significant that they emerged in late 19th century Europe, in the context of the
collapse of Victorian liberalism? Would it not be useful for one of their neuro-economists to know that the aspiration to
ground decision-making in the physical body has been a repeated obsession of behaviorists over the past century,
which has run into a pattern of familiar failures and crises during that time? Viewed this way, it might be possible to
ask about the status of the social sciences in 2014, as something other than mere understudies to the natural
sciences. A new form of ‘interdisciplinarity’, possibly a new vision of experimentation , may be the welcome result.
The difficulty is that this would involve placing demands on the natural sciences, as well as on the social sciences.
And this seems to be the one thing that Goodall, Oswald and Christakis cannot countenance. The shared terrain
rests on various acts of forgetting on the part of the social sciences (a forgetting of history, a forgetting of the reflexive
nature of human beings), but no acts of learning on the part of the natural sciences.  It involves no searching
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questions regarding the natural sciences – such as their status within the American military-industrial complex – but
merely encouragement to the social sciences that they should become equally co-operative. Is this really what we
mean by interdisciplinarity?
Much of what gets tagged as the ‘conservatism’ of social science might otherwise be understood as ‘sympathy’ for
the concepts and language which research subjects (or research users, such as policy-makers and business)
employ and understand. It is important to understand the ways in which behaviorism and manipulative experiments
blow up, both ethically and scientifically. There are critiques of neuroscience, such as Bennett and Hacker’s, which
help to understand precisely when and why this discipline occasionally seems to veer into the nonsensical use of
language.
In an age of unnerving Facebook emotional contagion experiments, and an economics discipline still largely
modelled upon 19th century physics, the idea that the social sciences can best serve society by closing their eyes
and straining even harder to produce knowledge resembling biology or chemistry, seems almost perverse. Goodall
and Oswald take it for granted that the way for social scientists to do “their job of helping humans to understand the
world and improve life” involves reaching out to the natural sciences, with no offer of reciprocity. Christakis takes it for
granted that social science means spotting patterns in behavior. These assumptions aren’t even acknowledged let
alone justified. We should count ourselves fortunate that Thomas Piketty does not share their premises, or we’d
have been robbed of one of the most exciting and ambitious pieces of interdisciplinary social science of the last thirty
years.
There is scope for change, and the stakes are high. On that, most people are agreed. Goodall and Oswald’s
example of global warming as a challenge to the social sciences is a compelling one. But it is surely an even greater
challenge to our political institutions. Political scientists and anthropologists could therefore collaborate to understand
how effective policies run into the ground. Economists and sociologists should work together, to understand how the
needs of finance have come to trump all other notions of the global public good. All of this would need
communicating better, outside of journals. But it also requires firm resistance to the idea that ‘science’ can solve
problems which are outcomes of institutional, cultural and political history, and not simply matters of nature and
technology.
This is part of a series of posts ahead of the event on Tuesday 21st October, Do We Need to Shake Up the Social
Sciences #LSESocialSciences. You can find our interview with Nicholas Christakis which kicked off the
debate here.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Impact of Social Science blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please review our Comments Policy if you have any concerns on posting a comment
below.
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